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Why Aristotle Says There Is 
No Time Without Change 
Tony Roark 
The title of this paper is intended as a provocative (but friendly) reference 
to Ursula Coope's recent article 'Why Does Aristotle Say That There Is 
No Time Without Change?', which provides much of the impetus for the 
present paper.1 For although Coope's strategy in answering this question 
is admirable, and although I think that her criticisms of the standard 
interpretation of the argument that opens Physics IV 11 hit their mark, I 
believe that her own interpretation fails and that something rather like 
the standard interpretation is correct. In the first section, I rehearse 
Coope's treatment of the standard interpretation and critically evaluate 
her alternative to it. In the second section, I present an interpretation of 
the argument that seems to me to succeed where the others fail and also 
to hold the promise of being quite fruitful in reconstructing the rest of 
Aristotle's temporal theory. While such a reconstruction lies well beyond 
the scope of this paper, I shall conclude by mentioning a few of the more 
significant points that fall out of the interpretation developed here. 
I Fleshing Out the Argument: Two Schools 
Aristotle's constructive account of time begins in Physics IV 11, which 
opens with a hotchpotch of arguments whose relation to one another is 
not immediately evident. His first move is to qualify two arguments in 
1 Ursula Coope, 'Why Does Aristotle Say That There Is No Time Without Change?', 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (2001) 359-67 
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IV 10 against identifying time with change by conceding that time does 
not exist without change (Alia men oudr aneu ge metaboïés, 218b21). He 
then offers what appears to be an argument for the concession and then 
restates the conclusion at 218b33. The sole premise offered in support of 
the conclusion, so it seems, is the observation that we perceive time 
whenever we perceive change, but never when we don't perceive 
change.2 Tidied up a bit, this argument runs as follows: 
Argument A (218b21-19al) 
1. We perceive time when, but only when, we perceive change. 
2. Therefore, time does not exist without change. 
Aristotle announces that we must take this conclusion as the starting 
point and that our task is to determine precisely what time has to do with 
motion and change (219a2-3), strongly suggesting that he imagines that 
the argument is more or less complete as stated. 
What are we to make of Argument Al Why should we regard it as 
valid (if indeed it is intended to be deductive)? Unfortunately, Aristotle 
is of little help; rather than explaining how he intends the argument to 
work, he simply offers anecdotal evidence for the truth of the premise. 
In support of the claim that perceiving change is a necessary condition 
for perceiving time (one half of the premise, construed as a bicondi- 
tional),3 he recounts a legend according to which sick individuals would 
go to Sardinia for treatment followed by a five-day period of sleep.4 
Because they do not notice anything oing on around them while they 
are asleep (and, presumably, because they emerge from their long slum- 
ber disoriented, perhaps unaware even that they have been sleeping), it 
doesn't occur to them that any time has passed without heir notice (ou 
dokei . .. gegonenai chronos, 218b21-7). The sleepers 'connect up the former 
now with the later now and make them one, removing what's between 
for failing to perceive it' (218b25-7). So noticing change seems to be 
necessary for noticing the passage of time. 
2 Despite Aristotle's diverse terminology (metaboïé, kinesis, phora), I shall follow 
Coope's lead in speaking primarily of change. 
3 I shall throughout this paper ignore certain technicalities by referring to this claim 
as a biconditional nd to its parts as conditionals. 
4 Cf. W.D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics (Oxford: Clarendon 1936), 597. 
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Strangely enough, Aristotle does not offer any justification for the 
other half of Argument A's premise until after he has restated the 
argument's conclusion. This, as we shall see, is just one way in which the 
argumentative structure of the opening passages of IV 11 is a muddle. 
At any rate, the drowsy imagery of Aristotle's first illustration carries 
over into the second, which is supposed to convince us that perceiving 
change is sufficient for perceiving time: 
[F]or even if it is dark and we are not subject to bodily sensations, but 
some sort of change occurs in the soul, it immediately seems that some 
time has also passed. (219a4-6) 
While one might question whether these illustrations really do estab- 
lish the truth of the premise of Argument A, the claim is plausible 
enough. Granted, we typically do not consciously entertain the proposi- 
tion that time is passing whenever we attend to some particular change, 
but we certainly are disposed to say that time passes whenever we 
witness change, and no sane person (or so one might hink) would ever 
claim that change can take place outside of time.5 
But even if we are willing to grant the truth of its premise, the logical 
character of Argument A is questionable, to say the least. Surely there 
must be some logically adequate suppressed premise that would be 
acceptable to Aristotle. But what is it? Two schools of thought have 
emerged under the influence of this problem. 
The traditional school of thought is one I shall call the Verificationist 
school', and includes the likes of Sydney Shoemaker, Richard Sorabji, 
and Edward Hussey.6 According to the verificationists, Aristotle iscom- 
mitted to the following suppressed premise: any postulation of imper- 
ceptible temporal intervals i  false (or perhaps even meaningless).7 If we 
construe the premise of Argument A so as to imply the claim that any 
5 The parenthetical hedge makes room for Aristotle's own view on the matter. He 
maintains in Ph IV 14 that change would exist without ime, were there no counting 
souls (223a21-9). I shall say more on this below. 
6 Sydney Shoemaker, Time Without Change', Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969) 363-81; 
Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press 1983); Edward Hussey, Aristotle's Physics, Books III and IV (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1983) 
7 Cf. Sorabji, 75. 
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temporal interval free of change (such as there might be) would be 
imperceptible, then the supplied verificationist premise licenses the 
conclusion that there simply aren't any such changeless intervals. Time 
does not exist without change. 
Coope's principal objection to this interpretation is that it renders half 
of the premise of Argument A superfluous. The supplied verificationist 
premise needs just the claim that we perceive time only when we perceive 
change to justify the conclusion; why, then, would Aristotle bother 
claiming that we perceive time whenever we perceive change? The claim 
of sufficiency could more easily be written off as a simple infelicity were 
it not for the fact that Aristotle repeats the biconditional fter restating 
the conclusion of Argument A (219a3-4). The verificationist therefore 
seems committed to the view that Aristotle ither fails to perceive the 
superfluous nature of the sufficiency laim, or he simply neglects to point 
out that it is superfluous. Coope rightly maintains (360-1) that this is an 
undesirable commitment, and that an otherwise equally plausible alter- 
native interpretation that accounted for both halves of the biconditional 
would be far preferable. 
An additional objection to the verificationist reading points up the 
peculiarity of attributing the suppressed verificationist premise to Aris- 
totle in the first place. Why should we take Aristotle to have verification- 
ist leanings in connection with time when he seems to have them 
nowhere lse? In the absence of some independent reason to attribute 
such a view to Aristotle (and the verificationists provide none),8 the 
move looks ad hoc. 
The alternative interpretation that Coope recommends seeks to evade 
both of these objections and serves as the touchstone for the other school 
of thought, which I shall call the 'Owenian school'. Coope takes Aris- 
totle's argument at the opening of IV 11 to employ a method he employs 
elsewhere, namely that of arguing from appearances. As Owen notes in 
his famous essay,9 Aristotle treats 'phainomenorí as an open-textured 
8 Strictly speaking, this isn't true, since Hussey looks to IV 14 for support for his 
supplemental verificationist premise (142). Coope objects (361) that his couldn't be 
right insofar as the discussion in Chapter 14 presupposes Aristotle's official defini- 
tion of time, and the definition presupposes the soundness of Argument A. I concur. 
9 G.E.L. Owen, 'Tithenai ta Phainomena', in Aristote t les Problèmes de Méthode, ed. S. 
Mansion (Louvain: Publications Universitaires deLouvain 1961) 
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term, so that arguing from appearances might involve reasoning from 
empirical observations, reckoning what the majority of people believe, 
or considering the accepted usage of an important term. Coope has 
something like the second sense in mind: 'On [Aristotle's] view, the fact 
that we make this assumption [sc, that there is no time without change] 
in our ordinary judgements provides a prima facie ground for taking it 
to be true' (362). The locus classicus for Aristotle's commitment to the 
principle invoked here is Nicomachean Ethics X 2: 
Those who object that hat at which all things aim is not necessarily 
good are talking nonsense (trié outhen legousin). For we say that hat 
which everyone thinks really is so (pasi dokei, taut' einai); and the man 
who attacks this belief will hardly have anything more credible to 
maintain stead. (1172b36-3a2) 
The principle Aristotle employs in this passage is rather stronger than 
the one invoked by Coope, as Aristotle indicates that contradicting 
common opinion amounts to talking nonsense, whereas Coope's inter- 
pretation requires only that doing so is prima facie mistaken. But so 
much the better for Coope's purposes! As she reads Physics IV 11, 
Aristotle's commitment tothis principle figures in his larger program in 
the following way: (a) Aristotle wants 'to set up a starting point for his 
inquiry into time ... by assuming that time is essentially related to 
change' (362); (b) he attempts to justify this starting point by making 
plausible the claim that time cannot exist without change and also the 
claim that change cannot exist without ime (362-3); (c) the explicit reason 
provided for these claims is the observation that we perceive time when, 
but only when, we perceive change (ibid.); (d) the judgments attending 
these noticings 'embody' the assumptions that ime cannot exist without 
change and vice versa (ibid.); (e) by employing the principle in question, 
the alleged fact appealed to in (d) effectively satisfies the desideratum 
specified in (b), and therefore s rves to set up the intended starting point 
identified in (a). 
It is item (b) that helps the Owenian school evade the first objection 
to the verificationist interpretation. Byinsisting that Aristotle isarguing 
tacitly for the converse of the explicitly-stated conclusion that there is no 
time without change, Coope manages to bring the sufficiency claim of 
Argument A's premise into the picture. Her reasons for attributing the 
additional conclusion to Aristotle is that it 'is needed for assuming that 
time is essentially related to change' and that parity of reasoning seems 
to commit him to it (362-3). 
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The Owenian school evades the second flaw in the verificationist 
interpretation byemploying 'a principle that is already familiar from 
elsewhere in Aristotle's work' (365), rather than one that looks tailor- 
made for the problematic passage. It seems that Coope is on firmer 
ground here, appealing as she does to a well-established tradition con- 
cerning one of Aristotle's dialectical methods. 
Now, with respect to the first point, I find Coope's case to be wanting. 
Why, we should ask, doesn't Aristotle make explicit the claim that 
change cannot exist without ime, if he were in fact committed to it? 
Coope's explanation (in a footnote) is this: 
Perhaps it is because he wants to draw the former conclusion [se, that 
time is essentially related to change] rather than the latter [sc, that 
change is essentially related to time] that he places so much more 
emphasis on the claim that here is no time without change than on the 
claim that here is no change without time. (363, n. 13)10 
It is surely an understatement to say that Aristotle places 'more empha- 
sis' on the claim that there is no time without change, since he nowhere 
says that there is no change without ime. Indeed, he explicitly denies 
the claim that it is impossible for change to exist without ime in IV 14.11 
Had Aristotle admitted even provisionally that there is no change with- 
out time, one would have expected him to make some kind of remark 
about abandoning the idea when he contradicts itin the final chapter of 
Book IV, but he makes no such remark. This element of the Owenian 
school's interpretation strains the text to its very limits. 
With respect to the second point, I do not deny that Aristotle argues 
from appearances elsewhere in the Physics. However, it does not seem 
to me that Aristotle isarguing from appearances at the opening of IV 11. 
To see why, we shall need to examine Coope's specification of how the 
Owenian principle is employed in this context: 
[Aristotle's] view, Ibelieve, is that our practices in judging whether o  
not ime has passed embody certain assumptions about he relationship 
10 I am grateful to Marc Cohen for helping me see that Coope seems to use the phrase 
'is essentially related to' as a variant on 'is defined in terms of. 
1 1 Coope notes this fact herself in connection with her discussion of Hussey 's version 
of the verificationist reading (cf. n. 8 above). 
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between time and change. In making these judgements we take it for 
granted that here is no time without change  (362, emphasis added) 
Coope goes on to quote two familiar pieces of the text relevant o her 
interpretation and then reiterates her position: 
Whenever it seems that a certain time has passed, a certain change 
seems to have passed together with it (219a7-8). 
When we do not mark any change but the soul seems to remain in 
one indivisible, it follows that we think there is no time (218b29-32). 
Aristotle thinks that when we make these ordinary judgements about 
whether time has passed, we are assuming that here is no time without 
change. (362, emphasis added) 
Notice that the judgments behind which the alleged embodied belief lies 
are specified narrowly as ones concerning the passage of time. So one's 
judgment that a certain interval of time has passed allegedly embodies 
the belief that there is no time without change. In the passages Coope 
cites, Aristotle is expressing the necessity of perceptions of change for 
the perception of time and, equivalently, the sufficiency of perceptions 
of time for the perception of change. How is this interpretation supposed 
to work? 
In order to answer this question it is first necessary for us to under- 
stand what Coope has in mind when she talks about embodied beliefs: 
I have spoken of beliefs that "lie behind" or are "embodied in" the 
judgements we make. But what is it for abelief to be "embodied in" the 
judgements we make? Aristotle is not claiming that we all explicitly 
believe that here is no time without change or change without time. 
His claim is only that these beliefs would explain and justify the 
particular judgements we make about whether o  not time has passed. 
(365, n. 16) 
The belief that there is no time without change, then, is supposed to be 
capable of explaining and justifying one's judgment that some interval 
of time has passed. But this hardly could be correct. The embodied belief 
is rather better suited to explain and justify the judgment about the 
occurrence of change: if an agent judged that some interval of time had 
transpired, then a dispositional belief that time requires change might 
well lead him to believe that some change had also occurred. This way 
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of thinking about the matter certainly accords much better with the text 
that Coope cites, since it takes perceptions of time to be sufficient for 
perceptions of change. An analogous problem plagues Coope's treat- 
ment of the putatively embodied belief that change requires time, as she 
maintains that this belief lies behind our judgments concerning the 
occurrence of change.12 
This flaw could be remedied simply enough by systematically inter- 
changing the two types of embodied belief. Unfortunately, there are 
other problems for this interpretation. For first of all, I think it's quite 
implausible to maintain that either our judgments about change or those 
about time are acquired or justified inferentially, and I also think that 
Aristotle would have recognized the implausibility. Our beliefs about 
both change and time arise out of experience and are justified (when they 
are) by the same.13 But even setting that worry aside, when conjoined 
with her account of the role played by embodied beliefs, Coope's com- 
mitment o the claim that Aristotle argues from appearances to the 
conclusion that time requires change and the conclusion that change 
requires time saddles Aristotle with absurdity. Recall: the belief that ime 
requires change is allegedly embodied in our judgments concerning the 
passage of time, and the belief that change requires time is allegedly 
embodied in our judgments concerning the occurrence of change.14 
Embodied beliefs are ones that 'would explain and justify' these judg- 
ments. Not by themselves, of course: each must take an antecedent 
judgment concerning change or time to serve as an initial premise. That's 
the point, as I understand it, of saying that he conditionals Aristotle trots 
out reflect 'our ordinary thinking' (363). One perceives some change in 
12 Although Coope does not explicitly specify the judgments as such, when one 
considers the context in which she mentions 'these ordinary judgements' (363), it's 
clear that she must mean judgments about change. 
13 Cf. Cooper's complaint about the traditional interpretation of Aristotle's treatment 
of the practical syllogism in EN and MA: '[H]aving decided to eat chicken, the agent 
approaches the table, sees the chicken and takes some - the act of perception not 
providing a piece of information which is then, as it were, detached and used in a 
little argument issuing in the act of eating, but instead itself forming a link in a 
psychological chain leading from decision through perception to action.' (John M. 
Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle [Indianapolis: Hackett 1986], 52) 
14 For simplicity's sake I here retain Coope's pairings of embodied beliefs with 
associated judgments. 
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his soul; he then determines that some interval of time must have passed 
on the basis o/his implicit belief that change requires time. 
The problem, to put it bluntly, is that the explanatory scheme Coope 
sketches forms a closed figure. For unless our judgments concerning the 
passage of time are inexplicable, there is some explanation for them. If 
the embodied belief is not wholly irrelevant to the actual explanation for 
these judgments, then if the embodied belief would explain the judg- 
ments about time, it does explain them.15 That is, to make the embodied 
belief actually relevant, it must be made to be an element in the explana- 
tory chain for the explicit judgment. So part of the explanation for one's 
believing that time has passed is his implicit belief that change requires 
time.16 But that's not the complete explanation. Another part of the 
explanation is his having perceived some episode of change. So if the 
embodied belief is at all relevant o the judgment in question, then the 
judgment is formed (in part) on the basis of another judgment concern- 
ing the occurrence of change. As I indicated above, this explanation 
strikes me as specious; but because Coope also maintains that the expla- 
nation for one's believing that change has transpired is formed (in part) 
on the basis of another judgment concerning the passage of time, the 
explanatory trail loops back on itself: we believe that time has lapsed in 
part because we believe that change has occurred, and we believe that 
change has occurred in part because we believe that time has lapsed. 
Since circular explanations aren't genuine explanations at all, Coope is 
mistaken when she claims that the two allegedly embodied beliefs 
would explain our judgments concerning time and change.17 
15 As Coope herself remarks in the footnote excerpted above, '[Aristotle] is saying, 
rather, that this is a belief which explains and justifies our judgements' (365, n. 16, 
emphasis added). She refers here to Aristotle's account of voluntary actions in EN 
III 5, but if the reference is intended to illuminate her application of the Owenian 
principle to the argument in Ph IV 11, the subjunctive formulation used earlier is 
unnecessarily weak. 
16 Here I employ the revised pairings of embodied beliefs and associated judgments, 
since I'm attempting to characterize the explanatory mechanism charitably. 
17 Similar problems arise in connection with Coope's claim regarding justification, 
though matters get more complicated here on account of the controversy surround- 
ing the nature of justification itself. I think the foregoing objection framed in terms 
of explanation casts sufficient doubt upon Coope's interpretation to motivate 
finding a better alternative, so I shall set aside this issue. 
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My objection can be summed up quite simply. Coope's interpretation 
of Aristotle as arguing from appearances involves positing explanatory 
mechanisms. These mechanisms proceed from a belief about change (or 
time) and an ontological principle concerning the relation between 
change and time to a belief about time (or change). But because she thinks 
Aristotle iscommitted to symmetrical ontological principles, the percep- 
tual beliefs in the explanatory scheme stand both as explanans and expla- 
nandum to each other. This is obviously unsatisfactory. Bythe principle 
of charity, then, we may conclude that Coope must be mistaken in one 
way or another: either Aristotle is not arguing from appearances at the 
opening of V 11, or else he is not committed to the claim that change 
cannot exist without ime. I shall argue that she is mistaken on both 
counts. 
II A New Old School 
Despite its inadequacies, there is something right about the verification- 
ist interpretation, and the interpretation I shall endorse bears certain 
affinities with it. I begin by examining some of the text that surrounds 
Argument A. After stating the initial conclusion that time does not exist 
without change and reiterating the point that we perceive change and 
time together (219a3-4), Aristotle draws what seems to be a more specific 
conclusion than that of Argument A: 
Argument B (219a2-10) 
1. Time is either identical to change or is some aspect of change. 
2. Time and change are not identical, (cf. 218bl8.) 
3. Therefore, time is some aspect of change. 
Aristotle makes the claim that functions as the first premise at 219a8: 
hdste ëtoi kinesis ê tes kinêseõs ti estin ho chronos. The inferential particle 
(hoste) suggests that this is a consequence of some earlier claim, but 
Aristotle has added nothing to the mix prior to making this assertion; he 
has simply reminded us that time and change are perceptually concomi- 
tant and rehearsed his second illustration i  support of the premise of 
Argument A. So on what grounds does Aristotle make the claim? 
I maintain that Argument B is in fact part of Argument A, though 
Aristotle gives us precious little assistance in recognizing that this is the 
case. I read the inferential particle as indicating that the first premise of 
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Argument B is intended somehow to follow from the premise of Argu- 
ment A. For consider just the form of Argument A: 
1. We perceive x when, and only when, we perceive y. 
2. Therefore, x does not exist without y. 
If Argument B could be fashioned into the additional premises that are 
required for Argument A's cogency, two problems would thereby be 
solved: the otherwise lame Argument A would be made fit, and the 
apparently spurious 'koste' would find a home. In order to determine 
how Argument B supplies the required premises for Argument A, we 
must address the following question: what relations between the values 
for x and y in the argument-form above could explain the truth of 
instances of the premise and simultaneously license the corresponding 
conclusion? 
One relation that does the job is identity. If the substituends for x and 
y are coreferring terms, then (provided that 'perceives' is read de re)18 the 
instantiated premise of our argument-form will be true, and we have 
before us a very good explanation of its truth. If Phosphorus just is 
18 The distinction between de re and de dicto perception is not to be confused with the 
distinction Aristotle draws in de An II 6 between kata sumbebëkos and kath hauto 
perception. Whereas the latter distinction is based upon the features of perceptible 
objects that are causally efficacious relative to the function of our various perceptual 
faculties, the former distinction trades on the difference b tween cause and content. 
For example, color (one of the 'proper perceptibles') and movement (a 'common 
perceptible') are perceived kath hauto, since our eyes are sensitive to these very 
things. In contrast, he son of Diares is perceived kata sutnbebëkos, since none of our 
perceptual faculties i attuned specifically to substances, let alone to male offspring 
of this particular man; what one perceives kath auto is (say) a moving white thing 
that just happens to be the son of Diares. The distinction between de re and de dicto 
perception, as I conceive it, is glimpsed by Aristotle atSens 446bl8-24 and cuts across 
the distinction drawn in de An II 6. Something (which may, but needn't be a 
substance) is perceived de re just in case it originates a causal chain that produces a 
perceptual event in an agent. The agent might be wholly ignorant of the item's 
character and might even fail to recognize it altogether. The only requirement is that 
there is in fact something such that it contributes causally (in the typical sort of way) 
to an act of perception. On the other hand, de dicto perception consists in the 
conceptual content of an act of perception under which the agent perceives the 
intended item. So one might perceive the son of Diares variously as a moving white 
thing, as a man, or as the very man that he is. What one perceives de dicto is a moving 
white thing, a man, and the son of Diares, respectively. 
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Hesperus, then it's obvious both that and why Theophanis perceives (de 
re) Phosphorus exactly when he perceives Hesperus, since there is but 
one object to be perceived. Additionally, it is also true that Phosphorus 
does not exist without Hesperus, since each of them is just Venus, and 
nothing can exist without itself. Hence, if the substituend-pair for x and 
y is a member of a set of pairs of coextensive terms, we have a viable 
reconstruction fArgument A. 
Although identity renders the argument viable, it cannot be the 
justification that Aristotle has in mind, because he takes himself to have 
established in IV 10 that time is not identical with change (witness the 
second premise of Argument B). Therefore, we must look elsewhere.19 
The alternative Aristotle considers in the first premise of Argument B - sc, that time is some feature or aspect of change (tes kinéséõs ti) - 
would certainly go a long way towards explaining the fact that we 
perceive time only when we perceive change, since perceiving the fea- 
tures of something plausibly requires perceiving (once again, de re) the 
thing itself.20 But surely there are values for x and y, where x is some 
feature of y, and yet it's false that we perceive x whenever we perceive y. 
For example, if x is the molar weight of some chemical compound y, there 
is nothing to guarantee that perceiving the latter strictly requires per- 
ceiving the former, in the de re sense of 'perceiving' or any other sense. 
Indeed, it would be wildly implausible to maintain that anyone ever 
perceives the molar weight of a particular chemical compound outside 
the rather extraordinary circumstances presented by laboratory experi- 
ments.21 Some features of perceptible objects are such as to be hidden in 
most contexts. 
The very fact hat there are such 'occult' features invites us to consider 
whether there might be some that are unmistakable, impossible to 
19 Aristotle's claim regarding the possibility of change without ime in Chapter 14 
might hought to be additional grounds for rejecting identity, but see n. 8 above. 
20 This claim presumes that he feature in question belongs exclusively to the relevant 
token or type of perceptible item. For example, it's impossible that someone should 
perceive Callias' tallness without perceiving Callias himself. But more on this below. 
21 I assume here that the molar weight of a chemical compound plays no significant 
role in determining the substance's perceptible features. If this assumption is 
incorrect (as it might be, for all I know), then by my own account of de re perception, 
one could perceive its molar weight de re. Such worries aside, I hope that my point 
is clear enough. Thanks to Jim Hankinson for making me aware of this concern. 
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overlook. It seems to me that there are in fact such evident features of 
perceptible objects and that Aristotle might have just these in mind in 
his discussion of time, even if he failed to articulate the idea clearly in 
the context of that discussion. So let me be a bit more precise by giving a 
provisional definition of this notion: 
(EF) For any pair of perceptibles <x, y>, x is an evident feature of y iff 
x is a feature of y, and for any percipient z, z cannot perceive (de 
dicto) y without also perceiving its x. 
The idea here is that there are certain features of some items which are 
such that, should one fail to be aware of those features, one wouldn't be 
aware of the item itself. An example is the pair <volume, stone> (where 
by Volume' I do not mean any determinate quantity of volume, but 
simply some volume or other). If Theophanis fails to perceive a particu- 
lar stone as having volume, it is very difficult indeed to fathom how he 
could possibly be aware of the stone at all. He could not be aware of the 
stone as a stone, at any rate, since perceiving some F-type thing as an F 
plausibly requires the employment of the concept of F-ness, and any 
concept of a volumeless object is not the concept of a stone.22 Of course, 
the stone isn't identical with its volume, since it has other essential 
features (its mass, for example). Another example: <life, animalx If 
Theophanis fails to perceive a certain animal as being alive, then he must 
not perceive the animal as an animal, since the concept of an animal (on 
Aristotle's view, at any rate - cf. de Anima 412bl8-29) is in part the 
concept of a living thing. 
These two examples illustrate the significance of giving 'perceives' a 
de dicto reading, for it's quite possible that an individual should perceive 
a stone as something other than a stone without perceiving it as some- 
thing that has volume. (Perhaps he believes that what he sees is a 
reflected image in a mirror.) My present strategy is to exploit this fact by 
arguing that Aristotle takes the pair <time, change> to stand in the 
22 Note that I am not making the implausible claim that in order to perceive a stone as 
such, one must have an apperceptive belief, part of the content of which being a 
representation of his concept of volume. That is, one needn't hink about his concept 
of volume in order to perceive the stone as something possessing volume. All that 
is required is that his concept plays a role in his perceptual belief that a stone lies 
before him. 
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evident feature relation, since his doing so would justify the problematic 
half of the premise of Argument A: if time is an evident feature of change, 
then one would in fact perceive time whenever he perceived change. 
Unfortunately, though, the (EF) relation does not obviously justify the 
claim that we perceive time only when we perceive change. The problem 
is that the definition places no exclusivity constraints on the relevant 
type of feature vis-à-vis its possessor. That is, while any given stone 
possesses a certain volume, so do elephants and eyeglasses. So while it 
may well be true that one must perceive volume whenever he perceives 
a stone as such, he will also perceive volume when he perceives an 
elephant as such, and it is therefore false that he will perceive volume 
only when he perceives a stone. 
The solution to this problem is twofold. Greater care should be 
exercised in distinguishing types and tokens, and some kind of con- 
straint must be imposed on the relevant types involved. I have been less 
than cautious in constructing my examples, since the pairs figuring in 
them are framed in heterogeneous terms. While Volume' and 'life' are 
very commonly used as type terms or mass-nouns (one has no hesitation 
to use either term without any determiner), 'stone' and 'animal' are both 
more clearly token terms or count-nouns (one speaks indeterminately of 
stone and animal only in rather special circumstances). I hope that my 
laxity will be forgiven, however, in light of the fact hat Aristotle israther 
less careful than he ought to be in his own discussion of change and time. 
The premise of Argument A (as well as its conclusion) treats 'time' and 
'change' as type terms,23 while the illustrations offered as evidence for 
the premise are framed in terms of token episodes of change and inter- 
vals of time. The shift is unobjectionable so long as one makes certain 
assumptions about uniformity among members of the type and the 
representativity of the chosen examples. Aristotle apparently makes 
such assumptions. 
When the (EF) relation is recast o address these concerns, the result- 
ing notion is that of an evident proper feature: 
(EPF) For any pair of type-perceptibles <O, '|/>, O is an evident proper 
feature of ''f iff every token of '|/ (and nothing else, except by 
23 The lack of an indefinite article in Attic Greek lends to the confusion, but the absence 
of 't is' or some other determiner clearly indicates that Aristotle intends to be talking 
about time and change in general. 
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virtue its relation to some such token) has some token of O as 
one of its features, and for any percipient z, z cannot perceive 
any token of ''f as a ''f without also perceiving its token O. 
If the foregoing definition be thought too contrived to be found any- 
where in Aristotle, one need only examine his discussion of properties 
in Topics V 1-3 to see that he practically illustrates it himself. Consider 
what he says at 131b33-6: 
Thus, for example, a man who has stated that it is a property of a surface 
to be the primary thing that is colored, has used [in rendering the 
property] in addition something perceptible, being colored, but some- 
thing which evidently always belongs (toioutõ d' phaneron estin hupar- 
chon aei), and so the property of surface will in this respect have been 
correctly rendered. 
Given my terminology, this passage indicates that Aristotle regards the 
pair <color, surface> as falling in the extension of the (EPF) relation. 
Color and surface are both types each of whose tokens are perceptible 
(they are type-perceptibles); very surface has some color or other as one 
of its features;24 if any non-surface has color, it has it by virtue of being 
related to a surface (they being the primary colored things); and anyone 
who perceives a surface as such cannot fail to perceive its color - the 
color is 'something which evidently always belongs'.25 Other candidates 
from this section of the Topics: <rarity, fire>; <ensouled, living creature>; 
<panmorphic, liquid>. In each case, an agent who fails to perceive the 
first member of the pair cannot properly be said to perceive the second 
24 The surfaces of transparent substances (e.g., glass and water) might be thought to 
present a special challenge; however, Aristotle doesn't hesitate to commit himself 
to the claim that all bodies whatsoever are colored (Sens 437a6), and in fact it appears 
as though his theory of vision maintains that it is the surface of the air at the 
boundary of our eyes that is the immediate cause of our visual perception of bodies 
(cf. de An 419all-bl, 423a21-b7, and Sens 439al7-30). 
25 As a variety of the 'common perceptibles' (cf. n. 18 above), surfaces are perceptible 
by means other than sight, so it is not strictly correct o say that an agent cannot 
perceive a surface as such without perceiving it as colored. Perhaps Aristotle has in 
mind his view that sight is the most highly developed sense (cf. de An 429a3), under 
the influence of which one might well say that to perceive a surface in the fullest 
way possible, one must perceive it as being colored. 
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member of the pair as such, because de dicto perception involves the 
employment of concepts, and in each case the first member of the pair is 
a perceptible feature, the concept of which is included in the concept of 
the second member. A more germane example is the pair <distance, 
space>, since Aristotle draws a tight connection between space, change, 
and time in Physics IV II.26 This comparison cuts to the heart of Aris- 
totle's temporal theory, and I shall touch on it briefly in the conclusion. 
Like identity, the (EPF) relation gives us the means to account for the 
inference in Argument A. For if time is an evident proper feature of 
change, then we will perceive time only when we perceive change (it's 
a proper feature of change, after all), but also whenever we perceive 
change as such (since it's an evident feature). And so if Argument B is 
taken as an argument for the claim that <time, change> is included in 
the extension of the (EPF) relation, it can be incorporated into Argument 
A, and the resulting reconstruction is a rather plausible argument: 
Argument A-cum-B 
1. We perceive time when, and only when, we perceive change. 
(218b21-3, 219a3-8) 
2. It follows abductively (hoste) from (1) that either (i) change and 
time are identical, or (ii) time is an evident proper feature of 
change, since no other explanation for the truth of (1) is avail- 
able. (Cf. 219b8-9.) 
3. But time and change aren't identical. (218bl8) 
4. Hence, time is an evident proper feature of change. (From 2, 3 - cf. 219b9-10.) 
5. If x is a proper feature of y, then x does not exist without y. 
(Implicit premise) 
6. Therefore, time does not exist without change. (From 4, 5 - 
218b21.) 
26 'Since that which moves moves from something to something, and since every 
magnitude is continuous, motion follows magnitude; for it's because magnitude is 
continuous that motion is also continuous, and it's because motion is that time is' 
(Ph 219alO-14). Cf. Metaph 1021a29-32. 
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I take the plausibility of this argument as a mark in favor of my interpre- 
tation. Another mark in its favor as compared to Coope's: my interpre- 
tation is much more comfortable with Aristotle's remarks that we 
perceive change and time together (hatna - 219a3) and that we perceive 
time immediately (euthus - 219a6) when we perceive change, since Iclaim 
that they are related objects of a single act of perception, whereas Coope 
interposes an inference (albeit unconscious) between the perception of 
one and the judgment that the other must also be present. But though 
these features my interpretation are favorable, there are two significant 
objections that must be addressed before any general claim to its supe- 
riority may be made. 
The first objection is that my interpretation imports far too much 
content into the argument, content hat should have been made explicit 
were it intended. I respond, first, by pointing out that without he added 
content, the argument flounders, and as I have tried to show in section 
I, no other means of repairing the argument is satisfactory. Second, I 
should like to note that even having imported that content, he argument 
truly does represent just an opening move, since knowing only that time 
is an evident proper feature of change logically entails little more than 
the fact that time cannot exist without change. The important question 
still remains: in what way is time an evident proper feature of change? 
Aristotle's answer is that time is the number of change. The explication 
of this answer occupies Aristotle's efforts for the remaining chapters of 
Book IV. Compare this with the case of colors and surfaces: one might 
well be convinced that color is an evident proper feature of surface 
without having anything like a philosophically-respectable account of 
color.27 So I insist that although my interpretation does import a good 
deal of content into the argument, it does not import too much: the 
additional content is needed for the argument to go through, is not 
unfamiliar to Aristotle, and in no way threatens to render the rest of his 
discussion of time otiose. 
The second objection takes the form of a tu quoque. I complained in 
section I about the adequacy of Coope's explanation for Aristotle's 
failure to draw explicitly the conclusion she attributes to him (sc, that 
27 Note that although Aristotle seems to make color an evident perceptible feature of 
surface in Top V 3, he obviously does not think that his having done so relieves him 
of the burden of providing an account of color, since he undertakes the provision 
of just such an account in Sens 3. 
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there is no change without time); what explanation can I give for the fact 
that Aristotle claims that there is no time without change, but doesn't 
claim that there is no change without ime? The short answer is that 
Aristotle doesn't define change in terms of time. Fleshing out this re- 
sponse highlights a striking difference between my interpretation and 
that of the Owenian school. 
Coope takes Aristotle in a way to be reasoning from common sense. 
On this reading, his project is philosophically naïve, since it proceeds by 
way of discovering certain assumptions that we all allegedly make, but 
about which we were previously unaware. I do not share Coope's 
assessment of this situation. I do not think that Aristotle's arguments are 
intended to help him discover what time is; I think he comes to the table 
with a fully developed view in hand and that his arguments are intended 
to convince the reader that his definition is correct. But if Aristotle's 
arguments are polemical rather than probative, what should prevent 
him from deploying other elements of his philosophical arsenal? Specifi- 
cally, why shouldn't Aristotle exploit the sophisticated account of 
change and motion that he gives in the preceding book of the Physics? 
I maintain that nothing should prevent him. Indeed, it seems obvious 
to me that he must have this account in mind if his definition of time is 
to avoid circularity. As Coope herself notes (363, n. 12), it is the fact that 
Aristotle defines change in terms of potentiality and actuality - rather 
than in terms of temporally-variant property instantiation - that per- 
mits him to define time noncircularly as 'a number of change with 
respect to the before and after'. I, too, have argued that despite appear- 
ances, the definition isnot at all circular, since Aristotle's kinetic theory 
is developed in temporal-free terms and can be used to give a non-tem- 
poral sense to 'before' and 'after' as they appear in his definition of time.28 
Aristotle unveils his definition of time very shortly after rehearsing 
the arguments that open IV 11, and yet he nowhere indicates that he is 
abandoning some other conception of change in favor of his own defini- 
tion. We ought to conclude, then, that he has had it in mind all along. 
And if that is so, there is good reason for him to reject the idea that change 
could not exist without ime, as time does not figure in the ti In einai of 
change. But it still remains an open possibility that time is some proper 
feature or other of change, and thus could not exist in its absence. It is 
28 'Aristotle's Definition of Time Is Not Circular', Ancient Philosophy 23 (2003) 301-18 
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precisely this possibility that gets developed as Aristotle's considered 
view on time. 
Ill Conclusion 
I claim that the interpretation I am advocating is superior both to the 
Owenian school's and the verificationists', even though my own inter- 
pretation logically entails the latter. On my reading of opening of IV 11, 
Aristotle takes time to be a rather specific kind of perceptible feature of 
change. According to the verificationists, Aristotle rejects the idea of 
imperceptible temporal intervals. But if my interpretation is correct, 
imperceptible t mporal intervals would be imperceptible perceptible 
features, and these are obviously impossible. Thus, my interpretation 
entails the verificationists'. Still, my interpretation ught to be preferred 
over theirs insofar as it provides a substantive explanation for Aristotle's 
rejection of imperceptible t mporal intervals and supports both halves 
of the biconditional in the first premise of Argument A, whereas the 
verificationists' does neither. 
My interpretation is superior to that of the Owenian school insofar as 
it makes use of the sufficiency claim in the first premise (we perceive 
time whenever we perceive change) without attributing to Aristotle the 
claim that change cannot exist without ime, a claim that he explicitly 
rejects in IV 14 and is unsupported by his own account of change. But 
aside from this fact, my interpretation doesn't saddle Aristotle with an 
implausible conception of the origins and justification of our beliefs 
about the passage of time and the occurrence of change, even while 
claiming that Aristotle is arguing from appearances. Coope's interpre- 
tative motives are commendable, but her treatment of the argument does 
not stand up to scrutiny. 
I close with a brief remark about the possible fruit borne by my 
interpretation. I said in the previous section that there is reason to think 
that Aristotle would include <distance, space> in the extension of (EPF) 
and that he draws a tight connection between space, change, and time 
immediately after giving Argument B. If we think about the matter as 
Aristotle does, it should be clear to us that distance, conceived as a 
metric, is in some sense a mind-dependent feature of space. Because 
space is infinitely divisible, there are no natural units of space. We adopt 
some conventional length, treating it as a standard, and our treatment of 
it as such involves regarding it as 'undivided in perception' (Metaphysics 
1053a23). So without he activity of percipient agents like ourselves with 
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certain intentions and interests, there would be no non-trivial nswer to 
the question 'What is the distance between objects a and bV Thus, not 
only is distance an evident proper feature of space (something one 
cannot fail to perceive whenever he perceives a spatial interval as such), 
its very existence depends in part upon acts of perception. 
But given the fact hat Aristotle envisions change (rather, locomotion, 
the paradigmatic type of change, according to Physics 260a27-9) as being 
parasitic upon spatial intervals, he must imagine that there is some 
kinetic analogue to distance. That's just what time is: the metric of change 
(or as Aristotle puts it, 'a number of change (arithmos kinêséõs)'). The 
analogy is not to be taken lightly. Aristotle's view, as I understand it, is 
that distance stands to space in precisely the same way that time stands 
to change. This explains both the abundance of perception-talk long after 
Arguments A and B have been set out and his remark about the possi- 
bility of change without ime in IV 14.29 
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